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 “I can tell you that in the United States, the fact that we have free Internet - or 
unrestricted Internet access- is a source of strength, and I think should be encouraged. I 
think that the more freely information flows, the stronger the society becomes, because 
then citizens of countries around the world can hold their own governments accountable. 
They can begin to think for themselves. That generates new ideas. It encourages 
creativity."  
- Barrack Obama, President, United States 
 
“Blocking the Internet, cutting off global communication lines, and attempting to reach 
agreement with one’s own people by force of arms—all of this leads nowhere.”  
- Dmitry Medvedev, Former President and Prime 
Minister, Russian Federation 
 
We need “global monitoring of the threat of extremism” to include “establishing an 
agreed definition of extremism, maintaining a global database of extremist groups, and 
countering the spread of extremism in the Internet.”  
- Nikolai Patrushev, Security Council, Russian 
Federation 
 
Introduction 
Exponential Growth of Global Internet Usage & the Violent Extremist Threat 
The United Nations (UN) reported that the number of Internet users in the world reached two 
billion at the beginning of 2011 representing a fifty percent increase over the period of the 
previous five years.1 One in three people on the planet use the Internet. Cisco estimates indicate 
that total global Internet traffic increased eightfold over the period 2007-2012, and will increase 
another 29 percent over the period 2012-2016.2 Estimates indicate that the total number of 
Internet users worldwide will reach 2.8 billion by 2015.3 
 
Russia has an estimated 61.5 million Internet users in 2012, ranking number seven among 
nations in the world in terms of Internet usage.4 Russian officials estimate that the number of 
Internet users in Russia could reach ninety million by 2013.5 In 2011, .Ru moved from sixth to 
fifth place ranking of the largest domains in the world.6 The second Russian national domain .РФ 
                                                 
1
 “Number of Internet Users Worldwide Reaches 2 bln: UN” APF, January 26, 2011, available at: 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iL3JD4qYM6YTkh7BSVMHUn2z7qFg. 
2
 “Cisco Visual Networking Index: Forecast and Methodology: 2011-2016,” available at: 
http://www.itu.int/md/dologin_md.asp?lang=en&id=S12-WTPF13IEG2-INF-0002!!PDF-E. 
3
 “Internet User Forecast by Country,” ET Forecasts, 2012, available at:  
http://www.etforecasts.com/products/ES_intusersv2.htm. 
4
 “Top 20 Countries with the Highest Number of Internet Users,” Internet World Stats, 2012, available at: 
http://www.internetworldstats.com. 
5
 “Russian Internet Users to Reach 90 million in 2013,” The Economic Times, January 5, 2012, available at: 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-01-05/news/30593023_1_internet-users-broadband-internet-
access-satellite-internet-services. 
6
 “Russian Domain Space 2011: Outcomes and Development Prospects,” Coordination Center for TLD .RU/.РФ., 
October 5, 2012, available at: http://www.cctld.ru/en/news/news_detail.php?ID=3896&sphrase_id=88245. 
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also ranks among the top twenty among European nations in terms of usage.7 Among Russian 
Internet users, the most popular resources are available on Yandex.ru, Rambler.ru, and 
Wikipedia.ru.  
 
Social media and social networking has also grown exponentially. The number of Facebook 
users exceeded 800 million by 2012.8 Social networking and blogging communities popular in 
Russia include Vkontakte, Facebook, Odnoklassniki, Linkedin, My Space, Google, Twitter, 
Ushahidi, and more. Mikhail Yakushev observes that, “…Only a couple of years ago the number 
of users of Internet blogs or social networks was just a fraction of what it is now.  
 
Five years ago, these services were virtually unknown.”9 Russia’s former President and  
Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, started his own blog in 2008 engaging with the public on the 
popular LiveJournal. 
 
Nations have not been able to keep pace with preparing and responding to the security challenges 
accompanying the enormous growth of the Internet and social media networks. The threat of 
cyber war, cyber crime, and cyber terror has become very real and potentially devastating 
security challenges for nations of the twenty first century international community. Recent 
conflicts in Estonia and Georgia demonstrated the potential employment of cyber attacks in both 
state-to-state and non-state warfare. The Russian security and academic communities point to the 
cyber attack on Iranian nuclear facilities with the STUXNET virus as representing a critical 
turning point revealing the vulnerability of nation-states to cyber attacks. The world community 
is plagued today by threats of electronic identity theft, use of cyberspace by sexual predators, and 
many other types of criminal activity utilizing the Internet.  
 
One of the most serious threats we face is violent extremists’ harnessing of the Internet and 
social media to advance their agendas. The world community must not only confront terrorists 
and violent extremists in our public venues, as well as in the physical war zones, but equally or 
potentially even more important are the presence of those perpetrating ideologies of violence in 
the social networking sites to advance their narratives and interests. Moreover, all trends would 
only point toward the Internet and social media venues continuing to grow in the future, and we 
must anticipate that extremists purporting violence will continue to attempt to make full use of 
these mediums of communication. 
 
For Russia, and other nations of the world, 90 percent of Internet users are under the age of 
thirty-five. The plethora of extremist video sites available at YouTube, Google Video, and other 
venues featuring highly creative and illustrative images are widely accessed, particularly among 
the youth. The policy community is sorely in need of innovative and creative approaches crafted 
with sufficient appreciation of the dimensions of such a threat in an increasingly globalized 
world where information can be exchanged instantaneously and freely from any point on the 
earth.  
 
                                                 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 “Facebook Usage and Facebook Growth Statistics by World Geographic Regions,” Internet World Statistics, 
September 2012, available at: http://www.internetworldstats.com/facebook.htm. 
9
 Mikhail Yakushev, “Internet Governance: Politics and Geopolitics,” Security Index 16:2 (2010): 36. 
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Al-Qaida and its affiliates and other violent extremist groups have recognized the importance of 
images and perceptions, and widely utilize the traditional media and online platforms to 
disseminate their messages. Terrorist groups have skillfully employed the Internet and social 
media to recruit and indoctrinate followers, disseminate literature, instantaneously broadcast 
beheadings and other outrageous acts of violence, and to finance and coordinate attacks. The 
Task Force on the Future of Terrorism formed by the United States Homeland Security’s 
Advisory Council (HSAC) in 2007 offered the conclusion that the “Internet has become a major 
facilitator of terrorist activities, especially the spread of jihadist ideology…” 10 Russian terrorist 
expert Ekaterina Stepanova observes that the Internet, offering a means of real time exchange of 
information, provides the perfect mechanism for disproportionate magnification of acts of 
violence.11  
 
Philip Seib and Dana M. Janbek have documented the development of use of the Internet by 
contemporary terrorist groups. The establishment of azzam.com, originally established in 1996, 
eventually came to feature reporting on the Chechen and Afghan mujahedeen and offered a 
forum for exchanging teachings among the AQ-affiliated network throughout the world.12 Sites 
such as Al Neda, Global Islamic Media Front, Laskar Jihad and others have served the full range 
of objectives for these groups including facilitating the transfer of ideological convictions.13 For 
Russia, extremist websites such as Kavkazcenter.com promoting the establishment of an Islamist 
state in the Caucasus have posed a direct challenge to the existing government. The site is 
banned in Russia and appears on the world terror list for the United States, but Kvakazcenter.com 
continues to operate in several languages on the Internet. 
 
Observers have noted that the appeal of these sites stems from the fact that they are anonymous, 
cheap, provide global reach, and prove difficult to monitor or control. The Internet and social 
media arenas offer the gathering point or virtual forum for like-minded individuals with shared 
views, grievances, and perhaps some basis for common identity. As Sajjan Gohel notes “…the 
virtual world is fast becoming the most important meeting place for terrorists…. After 
consolidating relationships over the Internet, the recruits can then plot and plan mass casualty 
attacks while remaining in contact with their handlers over the World Wide Web…..”14 Johnny 
Ryan has observed that participation in these chat rooms and websites advancing conspiratorial 
or religio-identity messages and symbolism may fulfill a deep psychological need for community 
or identity in an otherwise existence devoid of a social network. As Ryan states: “To be a part of 
an elite network, particularly a conspiratorial one, might be a large part of a person’s 
existence….” which “…..allows a connection to an amorphous community to discuss matters 
regarded by the wider society as subversive, to find mentors, seek out justification….”15 “It 
                                                 
10
 Homeland Security Advisory Council, “Report of the Future of Terrorism Task Force,” U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (Government Printing Office: January 2007).  
11
 Ekaterina Stepanova, interviewed by author, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), 
Moscow, Russia, June 26, 2012. 
12
 Seib, Philip and Dana M. Janbek, Global Terrorism and the New Media: The Post Al Qaida Generation (London: 
Routeldge, 2011), 26-27.  
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Sajjan M. Gohel, “The Internet and its Role in Terrorist Recruitment and Operational Planning,” CTC Sentinel 
2:12 (December 2009). 
15
 Johnny Ryan, “The Internet, the Perpetual Beta, and the State: The Long View of the New Medium,” Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism 33 (2010): 676-677. 
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allows individuals who are isolated and alienated, both physically and psychologically, to feel 
that they are linked, empowered and members of an international movement..”16 Extremist 
groups can tailor their images for particular audiences, and they target specific groups of society 
to include adolescents, women, or children. 
 
In 2011, Russia’s Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev reported that approximately 7,500 
websites with extremist content were active in the Russian segment of the Internet.17 The 
problem of terrorism in social networks is included on the agenda of the Russian Security 
Council. In April 2011, then President Dmitry Medvedev held a meeting with representatives of 
the Internet community acknowledging the range of security challenges associated with the 
“…..explosive growth of the Internet/blogosphere including manifestations of extremism, 
terrorism, crime, and threats to personal data information…...”18 Dmitry Medvedev emphasized 
the difficulties these new mediums pose for managing the “creative commons” or issues of 
copyright.19 Medvedev emphasized that it was important that the President make the right 
decisions with respect to all social relations including the Internet.20  
 
The Arab Spring, combined with the widespread protest activity that took place in Russia during 
the Presidential election period in Spring 2012, brought the issues of the appropriate role of 
social media and regulation of these sources to center stage in Russia. Reflecting on concerns 
about the role of social media in revolutions, Oleg Demidov notes that, “…A harmless 
technology designed to help people socialize…is being portrayed as something of a weapon of 
mass destruction which poses a threat to the stability and security of individual nations and the 
international community as a whole.”21 In July 2011, Demidov had organized a major conference 
entitled “Social networking Services in the Contexts of National and International Security” 
bringing together officials of the secretariat of the Russian government, Russian Ministry of 
Communication, U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Russian Foreign Ministry’s MGIMO, and other 
representatives of the security of social media communities to discuss Internet security and social 
media.22 One of the main questions explored was whether social networking services could 
represent a national security threat. 
 
While the state controls much of the television and news media in Russia, citizens in 
contemporary Russian society have been able to rely on the Internet as a source of information 
and communication with few restrictions. Many in society are quite anxious today about the 
potential for increasing government regulation and monitoring of the Internet and social media. 
 
The United States will have to work together with partners throughout the world in finding the 
proper balance between protecting freedom of information and expression and security in 
                                                 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 “About 7,500 Extremist Websites Active in Russia – Interior Min.,” RIA Novosti, March 8, 2011, available at: 
http://en.ria.ru/russia/20110803/165530471.html. 
18
 “Meeting with Representatives of the Online Community,” Meeting Summary: Office of the President 
[Kremlin.Ru], Moscow, April 29, 201. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Oleg Demidov, “Social Networks in International and National Security,” Security Index 18:1 (2011): 23. 
22
 “Social Networks: Security Threat or Asset?” Conference summary: PIR Center Information (Moscow: Bulletin 
PIR Press, 2012): 5. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 6, No. 4
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol6/iss4/1
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.6.4.1
5 
 
managing the threat from violent extremists. At what point do nations undermine the basis for a 
democratic society in attempting to manage violent extremism in the Internet or social media 
arenas? How far can nations go in regulating websites, for example, in instances when those sites 
are used to recruit terrorists and organize violent attacks? Should we be concerned that nations 
might exploit the threat of extremism to thwart democratic freedom and development? The new 
media venues will continue to present challenges for democratic societies in considering 
imposition of various levels of regulation when the technology is manipulated for purposes of 
fostering violence and harm to society.  
 
Prospects for U.S.-Russia Security Cooperation on Countering Violent Extremism: 
Beyond the ‘Re-set’ 
When then Senator Barack Obama assumed the Presidency, the state of U.S.-Russian relations in 
the immediate aftermath of the Russo-Georgian war was more strained than at any period during 
Russia’s post-Soviet experience. At the Munich Security Conference in February 2009, U.S. 
Vice President Joseph Biden signaled early on that the new Administration sought to “press the 
re-set button” with Moscow, suggesting there are “many areas” where the United States “can and 
should be working together with Russia.”23  
 
In June 2010, following bilateral meetings held in Washington, President Obama suggested that 
he and Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev had “succeeded in re-setting” the U.S.-Russian 
relationship.24 Obama noted that the two leaders discussed issues of disagreement to include 
Moscow’s conflict with Georgia, and at the same time agreed to broaden cooperation in other 
critical areas. Significantly, in a period of only a few months, the United States and Russia 
succeeded in concluding a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (START) agreeing to mutual 
reductions and inspections. In addition, Russia is providing transit support for NATO’s 
International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) critical for the Afghan war effort, and the United 
States and Russia have expanded cooperation in the counter narcotics area working 
collaboratively in Afghanistan. The “re-set” was also accompanied by the creation of several 
U.S.-Russian presidential-mandated defense and military-to-military working groups aimed 
toward further deepening of security cooperation. Included among these are the U.S.-Russia 
working group on counterterrorism co-chaired by Daniel Benjamin (United States) and 
Alexander Zmeyevskiy (Russia), establishing countering violent extremism among the priorities. 
Both the United States and Russia have agreed that the issue of countering violent extremism 
requires additional active collaboration on the part of both nations and their counterterrorism 
partners. 
 
Initial accomplishments in the U.S.-Russia “re-set” were accompanied by progress in the NATO-
Russia relationship. While consultations in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) had been 
suspended in the aftermath of the Georgian War, the exchanges were resumed with both parties 
emphasizing that the NRC must remain operative even in times of serious tension to ensure 
continued exchange of information and problem solving. In January 2011, the twenty-nine 
Chiefs of Defense of the NATO-Russia Council met in Brussels and concluded a Work Plan for 
                                                 
23
 “Biden Vows Break with Bush Era Foreign Policy,” Reuters, February 7, 2009. 
24
 “Obama, Medvedev Say ‘Re-set’ US-Russia Relations,” Associated Press, June 24, 2010. 
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2011 covering several areas of security cooperation to include counterterrorism.25 In November 
2012, NATO and Russia completed the Joint Review of Twenty First Century Common Security 
Challenges that further defined the extensive range of shared security challenges faced by NATO 
and Russia, and identified priority areas for deepening cooperation in counterterrorism and other 
priority security issues.  
 
Although the “re-set” initially appeared to reverse the downward spiral in U.S.-Russian relations, 
two issues tended to dampen prospects continuing to deepen bilateral cooperation. First, despite 
initial expectations that the success of forging an agreement on European missile defense could 
serve as a “game changer” shifting the U.S.-Russia relationship to a genuine “strategic 
partnership,” the United States-NATO nations continue to remain deadlocked in failing to reach 
an agreement with Russia in this area. Russia’s President Medvedev had initially proposed a 
“sector approach” whereby Russia would be responsible for intercepting missiles over Russia’s 
territory bound for NATO nations. The Obama Administration rejected the proposal outright 
noting that NATO could never rely on non-NATO countries to include Russia for protecting the 
security of Alliance members. The Moscow leadership responded by threatening counter-
measures including deployment of Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad. 
 
A second major issue was Russia’s parliamentary and presidential elections in 2011-2012. The 
reaction to Putin’s re-election again was not received positively in Western capitals. Putin went 
to great lengths to create the perception of fairness in the election process including installing 
video cameras to monitor polling stations throughout the country for irregularities. However, the 
suppression of protest movements and storming the homes and confiscating money and 
equipment of opposition leaders crossed the line. The lack of a strong organized opposition 
virtually ensured Putin’s election yet again with the potential that he would serve as Russia’s 
President for two more six-year terms. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was particularly 
sharp in her criticism of both the parliamentary and presidential election process expressing 
“serious concerns” about the conduct of elections and the arrests of peaceful protesters furthering 
aggravating the U.S. relationship with Moscow. 26 Putin responded suggesting that U.S. 
Secretary of State Clinton was trying to “stoke political unrest in Russia” with her accusations. 
Many in the West and among Russia’s intellectuals were dismayed at what appeared to fall far 
short of standards for European-style democratic practice. 27  
 
Achieving further progress in the “re-set” in U.S.-Russia relations was also complicated by the 
Arab Spring. Concerns were raised regarding the potential spread of such movements into the 
Caucasus, Central Asia, and to the territory of the Russian Federation. Suggestions that the 
United States was somehow behind these uprisings were prevalent in policy and academic circles 
in Russia. The barrage of anti-U.S. coverage in Russia’s state-owned television stations became 
even more prevalent in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and during Russia’s elections. There 
was wide speculation in Russia that the United States was instigating or backing the revolutions 
                                                 
25
 “NATO-Russia Council Chiefs of Defence Approve the Work Plan for 2011,” NATO/Brussels, January 26, 2011, 
available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_70086,htm. 
26
 Elise Labott, “Clinton cites ‘Serious Concerns’ about Russian election,” CNN.com, December 6, 2011, available at: 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/06/world/europe/russia-elections-clinton/. 
27
 David M. Herszenhorn, “Despite Kremlin’s Signal, U.S. Ties Remain Strained After Russia’s Election,” New York 
Times, March 6, 2012, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/world/europe/ties-with-us-remain-strained-
after-russian-election.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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in North Africa and the Middle East. One analyst suggested that the Arab revolutions contributed 
to prompting deliberate attempts to further erode America’s image among the Russian public 
through media sources so as to make it increasingly difficult for the United States to effectively 
assist opposition groups during Russia’s presidential election period.28  
 
Vladimir Putin might have intended to signal a certain distance from the United States by 
traveling to China during the election period. Many Western analysts viewed Putin’s overtures 
toward China and the proposed Eurasian Union as evidence that he hopes to build a bloc among 
nations of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) in order to counter U.S. influence.  
 
Vladimir Putin’s first meeting with President Obama following his re-election to the Presidency 
of Russia omitted any discussion of “partnership” and instead included only references to 
“cooperation.” At the same time, during this first presidential meeting held in July 2012 in Los 
Cabos, Mexico, the two leaders again affirmed that, “…The United States of America and the 
Russian Federation are committed to furthering our multifaceted cooperation in counter terrorism. 
Both our nations face persistent and evolving domestic and transnational terrorist threats...”29 
Most recently, it was also encouraging that Russia granted ISAF permission to use the 
Ulyanovsk air base on Russian territory which will be especially important in supporting the 
withdrawal of NATO forces from the region.  
 
Within the Kremlin, there are those who desire greater democratization in Russia, those who do 
not, and those who are not sure. With respect to the U.S.-Russia “re-set,” there are influential 
forces in Russia’s foreign policy community that view this as a “one time flip of switch” doomed 
only to result in another cycle of confrontation, and those who believe that the “re-set” was 
simply the first step in what should be a long-term process of building greater security 
cooperation.  
 
While the United States and Russia share many common strategic interests, the perspectives and 
outlooks of both countries differ on a number of levels. The Russian leadership is determined to 
assert influence in the contemporary Middle East, and the Syrian case is perhaps one of the 
obvious illustrations of the differences in perspectives. Syria hosts the only Russian military base 
outside the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) at the port of Tartus, and military sales 
between the countries have been significant. Russia and China have held to a position of non-
interference in Syrian internal affairs, while the United States and other NATO nations have 
called for the use of force in the crisis prompted by the objective of ending the human rights 
abuses of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. 
 
Putin appears to be clearly set on a path of “strategic independence,” rather than integration with 
the Western security community. Putin’s recollection of Russia’s diminished status and influence 
during the period of the 1990s certainly contributes to making him quite determined to interact 
                                                 
28
 Mikhail Troitsky, interviewed by author, Moscow, Russia, June 23, 2012. 
29
 “Joint Statement by the President of the United States of America Barack Obama and the President of the Russian 
Federation Vladimir Putin,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, June 18, 2012, available at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/18/joint-statement-president-united-states-america-barack-
obama-and-preside. 
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with the United States from a position of strength rather than weakness. At the same time, Putin 
needs the United States and other Western nations for Russia’s economic growth and 
modernization. U.S. support for Russia’s admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
and measures underway for visa liberalization would support these economic development 
objectives.  
 
The Arab Spring and the recent presidential election have also complicated prospects for U.S. –
Russian cooperation in countering violent extremism as an aspect of the U.S.-Russia post- “re-set” 
strategic relationship. Concerns among Russia’s leadership that unlimited freedom in the social 
networking and media arenas could fuel similar upheaval among Russia’s neighbors or in 
Russian society makes it difficult to find common ground in addressing the violent extremist 
challenge. 
 
Perceptions of the Terrorist and Violent Extremist Challenge in Russia 
Russia’s central priority with the terrorist challenge has tended to concentrate on the threat 
emanating from Chechnya and the surrounding regions of the North Caucasus. Violence 
emanating from the Makhachkala region within Dagestan territory has been a priority concern in 
Russia’s counter terrorist efforts. While there has been no single assault in Russia resulting in the 
loss of thousands of lives, such as the September eleven attacks in the United States, the nation 
has suffered a series of terrorist incidents over the past several years. Bombings of apartment 
buildings, theaters, subways, airlines, the school hostage incident in Beslan in 2004, and the 
more recent attack at the Domodedovo airport in January 2011 perhaps captured the most 
international attention and demonstrated Russia’s vulnerability to the terrorist threat.  
 
The violent extremist threat in Russia spans the gamut from Islamist extremists to militant ultra-
nationalists. There are no official statistics on the number of Muslims in Russia. Figures range of 
three million to thirty million, with most sources estimating between eighteen and twenty million 
geographically concentrated in the large cities of the Volga-Ural and North Caucasus regions. 
Demographic trends indicating declining birth rates among Orthodox ethnic Russians compared 
with the relative growth among Russia’s Muslim population suggests the potential for shifting 
political and social influence in the future. While the bulk of Muslims in Russia, primarily of the 
Sunni, Hanafist, and Sufi traditions, simply seek to practice their faith in peace, adherents of the 
anti-Sufi New Islamic Movement and radical Shahidists and Salafists share the objective of 
imposing a fundamentalist Islamic state under sharia law. Sharia courts operate today on 
Russia’s territory in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Chechnya. While some observers consider the 
influence of Wahhabism and Salafism a more recent phenomenon in the North Caucasus, the 
writings of Dagestini scholar Yaseen (Makhach) Rasulov and leader of the Sharia Jamaat group 
who was killed in 2006 traces the origins of to the anti-Russian resistance movements of the 18th 
century.30 Socio-economic problems, unemployment, lack of opportunity, and corruption provide 
a fertile ground for recruiting followers in the region. Concerns with maintaining the territorial 
integrity of the Russian Federation have generated speculation about a potential contagion effect 
                                                 
30
 Andrei Smirnov, “Yaseen Rasulov: Dagestan’s Rebel Scholar,” Jamestown Foundation Chechnya Weekly 7:3 
(January 18, 2007); Rasulov contended that Chechen Sheikh Mansur in the 18th century and Dagestani Imams Kazi-
Mukhammad and Imam Shamil in the 19th century—were Salafists and Wahhibists. 
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of the Arab revolutions that might inspire young people who have become disenchanted with 
traditional Islam in the North Caucasus, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan.  
 
Russia includes the Muslim Brotherhood among terrorist organizations, and a number of Islamist 
or Salafist publications have been banned in the country. Prosecutors in Birsk in Russia’s 
Republic of Bashkortostan shut down a website during Summer 2012 for publishing a news 
portal entitled “Wake Up Tatar!” which was described as containing extremist ethnic and 
religious content.31 Islamist groups that do not purport the use of violence such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir 
have also been targeted and banned.32  
 
At the same time, the Russian government maintains constructive relations with the mainstream 
Islamic community in the country and abroad. Russian officials have engaged the Islamic 
community to combat extremism. Over the past several years, the office of the Russian President 
has held conferences involving the participation of foreign policy officials with Islamic religious 
clerics and leaders of other faiths in combating terrorism and extremism.33 Russia holds observer 
status in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and does not include Hamas and 
Hezbollah as terrorist organizations as does the United States and other Western countries. At 
times, the Russian foreign policy community has suggested that Moscow could serve as a 
“bridge” between the Islamic and Western worlds emphasizing the importance of avoiding any 
“clash of civilizations” or religions in addressing the contemporary global terrorist challenge. 34 
  
Extreme nationalist groups have become more widespread in Russia over the past two decades 
and are a source of greater concern.35 Riots in Manezhnaya square in December 2010 highlighted 
the problem when some 5,000 sports fans and nationalists groups went to the street in response 
to the death of a Spartak Moscow supporter who was killed in ethnic clashes with migrants of the 
North Caucasus. Vladimir Putin offered the observation that extremists used soccer fans as 
“cannon fodder” urging the necessity for “cracking down on all extremist organizations.”36 Putin 
noted: “…A person from the Caucasus should not be afraid to go out in the streets of Moscow, 
and our ethnic Slavic citizens should not be afraid to live in the North Caucasus republics...”37 In 
responding to the riots, Deputy Prosecutor General Alexander Buksman emphasized that “those 
                                                 
31
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32
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for Information and Analysis Report, April 27, 2012, available at: http://www.sova-center.ru/en/misuse/reports-
analyses/2012/04/d24302/. 
33
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held in July 2008 entitled ‘Islam Will Conquer Terrorism’,” available at: http://www.muslim.ru. 
34
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35
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Russia,” unpublished paper, 2011; For an excellent background source on political and ethnic extremism in Russia 
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Factors,” Nationalities Papers 35:5 (November 2007). 
36
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who disseminate extremist ideology” have made “the best use of the Internet.”38 Recent new 
migration laws to support labor needs have also fueled inter-ethnic enmity and clashes. 
  
Ultra-nationalist groups such as “Slavyansky Soyuz” or “Slavyanskaya Sila” (Slavic Union or 
Slavic Force) headed by Dmitri Demushkin [www.demushkin.com www.ns-88.org] also color 
the contemporary gamut of Russia’s extremist political mosaic.39 Extremist youth groups exist in 
almost all regions of the Russian Federation rallying under the banner of “Russia for the 
Russians,” “skinheads,” and others.40 Fascism has also grown in recent years in terms of those 
affiliated with groups such as “Blood and Honor” (the Russian branch of the international neo-
Nazi organization), “Russisky Kulak” (Russian Fist), “Nationalist Socialist Group 88,” 
“Skinlegion,” and others. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin acknowledges the problem noting 
that “…Even in our country that did so much to vanquish Fascism we see, unfortunately, 
manifestations that are cause for shame.”41 These groups have become increasingly 
technologically competent developing websites to aid their recruitment efforts, and engaging in 
hacking to promote their objectives. Demushkin’s “Slavyansky Soyuz” boasts an “information 
warfare department” pledging to close down websites of their so-called “enemies.”42  
  
Russia’s political parties throughout the spectrum promote the importance of Russian values, 
culture, tradition—or the “Russian” as opposed to the “Western” model as the path most suited 
for their country. Pro-Kremlin groups for example champion themes characterizing the “West” 
as the “Other” and “Russia” as “Nashi” (Ours), whereas ultra- nationalist right wing groups 
trumpet references to “Great Russia” and racial superiority. As such, mainstream messages of 
patriotic national identity can at times become blurred with extreme ultra-nationalism. Russia’s 
authorities have consistently spoken out against terrorism, extremism, xenophobia, and racism. 
However, Emil Pain makes the important point that Russian law enforcement authorities have 
been much more willing to employ force against Chechen nationalists and Islamist 
fundamentalists in the Republics of the North Caucasus, than to use coercive action in 
responding to extreme ultra- nationalist elements of the native populations.43  
 
Russia’s most recent National Security Strategy (to 2020) specifically identifies the threat of 
terrorism and extremism and vulnerabilities created by the “global information struggle.” The 
document states:  
 
“The global information struggle will intensify, threats will increase to the stability of 
industrialized and developing countries, their socio-economic development and 
                                                 
38
 “Extremist youth groups widespread in Russia deputy prosecutor general,” RIA Novosti, December 15, 2010, 
available at: http://en.ria.ru/russia/20101215/161787991.html. 
39
 For discussion of recent activities of Demushkin’s group, see SOVA Center for Information Analysis, “Spring 
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40
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41
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democratic institutions. Nationalist sentiments, xenophobia, separatism and violent 
extremism will grow, including under the banner of religious radicalism.”44 
 
Member of Russia’s Security Council Nikolai Patrushev has called for the creation of a “global 
watchdog” to monitor violent extremism and terrorism in the Internet.45 In an interview 
published in Kraznaya Zvezda following the 2012 Presidential elections, Patrushev offered the 
following observation on the relationship between terrorism, extremism, and information 
security:  
 
“At the threshold of the 21st century the primary threats to international peace and 
security have “shifted” to the information sphere. The intensive development of 
information and telecommunication technologies (IKT), the globalization of the 
information infrastructure and the information space along with its positive component 
also have the opposite side. In present-day conditions, the hostile use of IKT for criminal 
and terrorist purposes is becoming a real threat to international security.”46 
 
Patrushev continues underscoring the importance of international cooperation in information 
security: “...in modern conditions effectively providing national and international security and 
stability is impossible without strengthening security in the informational sphere, or as they are 
now saying, international information security...”47  
 
The Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church has expressed concern about the 
frequency of attacks made on religious leaders who resist extremism. Following a recent car 
bombing incident resulting in seriously injuring Mufti Ildus Faizov, Chief of the Synodal 
Information Department of the Russian Orthodox Church Vladimir Legoyda expressed concerns 
regarding increasing attacks against those “who resist extremism and preach the rejection of 
violence, and peaceful and balanced ways of dealing with problems…”48 He continued 
emphasizing that: “…Fighting religious extremism is an acute problem facing the public in 
Russia...”49 Archpriest Vsevold Chaplin has suggested that Russia and European countries 
should “adopt a law banning expansion of religious extremism, which results in deaths…..”50 He 
suggested that international organizations (Council of Europe and others) should equate the ban 
on religious extremism to the ban on Nazism, and noted that while “…Western ideologists 
believe a ban on spreading ideas is impossible. I am sure there is a need to restrict the expansion 
of such ideas as they justify the killing of civilians...”51 
 
Russia’s academic community has also addressed the terrorist and extremist information threats. 
For example, with support of the Russian government and the private sector, the Lomonosov 
Institute at Moscow State University has sponsored a series of conferences over the past several 
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years bringing together academics and security officials from many nations to examine the 
challenges related to information security in the cyber era. This initiative has led to breaking new 
ground in research, defining similarities and difference in perspectives among nations, and 
efforts to contribute to policy formation at the global level.  
 
Russia: Legal Foundations on Countering Terrorism & Violent Extremism 
In terms of building an international response, policy officials and scholars have been exploring 
the challenges for establishing legal foundations to meet the Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposure (CVE) threat in the World Wide Web. The United Nations establishes a legal 
foundation for responding to terrorism in UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373 and 
UNSCR 1624. While UNSCR 1373 made no mention of terrorist use of the Internet, UNSCR 
1624 did address the expanded range of challenges posed by terrorism stemming from the 
Internet domain.  
 
In the United States, the First Amendment protects freedom of expression, a major factor often 
impeding prosecution of suspected terrorists within the Internet and social media spheres where 
speech or even intended incitement of violence is insufficient basis for legal action. The United 
Kingdom is not bound by the same constitutional restrictions as the U.S., and has been more 
willing to prosecute terrorists in the Internet domain on the basis of intent to incite violence. The 
U.K.’s Terrorism Act of 2006 for example provided for broadening the government’s authority 
to deal with those who seek to provoke terrorist acts to include regulation or dissemination of 
violent extremist publications. 
 
Beyond the U.S. and U.K., one finds variations in the legislation or legal regulations to counter 
terrorist activity online. Turkish laws on terrorism demonstrate the variance among national 
legislation. Turkey’s 1991 law on terrorism imposed restrictions on the publication of leaflets, 
periodicals, and forming associations. Turkey has no law specifically governing the Internet, 
though the law enforcement bodies have attempted to apply the Turkish Press Law to restrict the 
use of the Internet. Jordan was the first country in the Middle East to endorse anti-terrorism 
legislation that was similar to most European nations. Jordan’s Anti Terrorism Law was 
implemented in 2006 following a series of suicide bombing attacks carried out by an al Qaida 
affiliate in Amman in 2005. In March 2008, Jordan began to impose additional restrictions in 
Internet cafes requiring owners to collect personal information on Internet users and to install 
cameras to be used for monitoring Internet usage.  
 
In Russia, the tragic Beslan school hostage attack was a major catalyst for increasing 
centralization of government decision making and enhanced powers and accountability for law 
enforcement and security forces in combating terrorism. In 2006, a new anti-terror law came into 
force in Russia permitting Russia’s security services sweeping powers to act against suspected 
militants and their supporters. Russian officials and lawmakers have pressed for stricter laws to 
regulate Internet usage both at home and in cooperation with other nations of the world 
community. Following the March 2010 subway bombings in Moscow, President Medvedev 
ordered that even tighter anti-terror laws be implemented. Articles 73 and 81 of the Criminal 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 6, No. 4
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol6/iss4/1
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.6.4.1
13 
 
Procedure Code were adopted into federal law to enhance the effectiveness of measures to fight 
terrorism and extremism in April 2011. 52  
 
Russia’s Federal Law “On Combating Extremist Activity” describes extremism as “activities of 
organizations or physical persons in planning, organizing, and carrying out acts aimed at inciting 
national, racial, or religious hatred.”53 While this law has been used to combat the dissemination 
of material that might incite violence, racial hatred, pornography, it has not been without 
considerable controversy. The law does not require establishing the threat of the use of inciting 
violence for prosecution. Russia’s anti-extremism law has increasingly been used against 
peaceful religious groups and individuals deeming their activities as security threats. Non-
traditional religious groups such as Jehovah Witnesses, Hare Kirshnas, and Scientologists in 
Russia have been repeatedly targeted under the law on extremism.54 Stepanova makes the point 
that definitions are further complicated by the fact that terrorism and extremism are frequently 
defined in Russia as anything that can be deemed pro-separatist.55  
 
Since 2007, the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation has compiled a list publications and 
materials deemed “extremist” and thus banned in the country.56 As of mid-2013, there were more 
than 1,500 titles banned as “extremist” in Russia, with the bulk of the material coming from 
Islamic literature. Some of the more controversial banned materials have included the work of 
Turkish theologian Said Nursi, Elmir Kuliyev’s “The Path of the Koran,” Ibn Kathir’s “History 
of the Prophets from Adam to Muhammed” or Sufi leaders Sefik Can’s “Fundamentals of 
Rumi’s Thought: A Mevlevi Sufi Perspective.” The recent wave of bans on Islamic materials has 
been deemed as “absurd,” and Islamic scholars and clerics have called for challenging court 
decisions restricting these materials.57 Questions have also arisen as to whether the law on 
extremism might be used increasingly to stifle the activities and publications of the opponents of 
the Putin’s United Russia party.  
 
National Level Responses/Issues 
Issues related to extremism on the Internet are managed by the Russian Federation’s Security 
Council, Ministry of Interior, and Federal Supervision Agency for Information Technology. In 
2011, then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev created an interdepartmental commission 
based in the Ministry of Interior responsible for combating extremism in Russia. Russia’s 
Information Security Doctrine (2000) formed more than a decade ago is still in effect, and at 
the time the original strategy was conceived social media had not been developed.  
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Those working these issues in Russia’s governmental structures devote the bulk of their 
attention to issues of education, crime, and especially to combating child pornography. 
Observers note that the Russian government relies heavily on Internet providers to counter the 
activity of extremism in online forums, but the providers are obviously not always able to 
effectively manage the posting of objectionable or criminal material online. Mikhail Yakushev 
notes that Russia’s approach to Internet governance has taken two forms including technical 
management issues such as procedures for domain name registration and rules for allocation of 
Internet Protocol (IP) numbers, and a broader approach encompassing humanitarian, economic, 
and political dimensions to prevent the Internet from being used for harmful purposes.58 
 
The Russian federal agency, Roskomnadzor, has been established to monitor Internet and media 
activities.59 The agency scans the Internet and other media sources and issues warnings to 
Internet providers in the event that written or visual material posted online is deemed extremist 
or harmful content. The system functions as a robot with the task of vigilantly monitoring online 
sources for objectionable material. Internet providers are provided with a notice to remove 
objectionable content within twenty-four hours, and failure to do so can result in fines or other 
reprisals such as suspending the service.  
 
During the summer of 2012, the Russian Duma passed three laws that were widely perceived as 
establishing a foundation that could be used to curb criticism of the government. The laws which 
came into force in November 2012, provided provisions for criminalizing slander, requiring non-
profits receiving funding from abroad to declare themselves “foreign agents” and provide 
additional financial information, and a final law sanctioning the blocking of websites featuring 
content that “could threaten children’s lives, health, and development...”60 Major Internet 
providers in Russia, Yandex, LiveJournal, Google Russia, and the Russian branch of Wikipedia, 
immediately protested the new law claiming that it was passed in order to censor the Internet.  
 
Since the laws came into effect November 1, 2012, the Mass Media Inspection Service has been 
permitted to block sites with objectionable content to include those promoting child pornography, 
suicide, or substance abuse, without the need for a court decision. Cases thus far on the Runet 
“blacklist” included Absurdopedia on one of the largest Russian language sites Rutracker.org for 
an article entitled “how to commit suicide the right way….”, and imposing a block on 
Lurkmore.ru for posting material on marijuana use.61 The Mass Media Inspection Service was 
reported to have issued a warning to Newsland.ru calling for removal of a fragment of the film 
“Innocence of Muslims” posted on its site.62  
 
While the government owns and exerts control on the main television and media outlets in 
Russia, Russia’s Internet users have enjoyed freedom of access to information from all over the 
world. Imposing legal and technical measures to regulate the Internet creates concern that it 
could be a first step in instituting a system of censorship of the media in Russia resembling the 
“Great Chinese Firewall” which blocks vast sections of the Internet from China’s population.  
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Russia’s Internet community and civic society has expressed concern that these measures would 
slow Internet service and freedom throughout the entire Runet. Leading academics worry that the 
new measures could limit academic freedom or the full access to information for research that 
they have enjoyed in the most recent decades. Activists in Russia’s blogosphere who freely 
criticize leading political leaders on websites and social media are concerned about potential 
pressure, censorship, or intimidation resulting from such posts.63 Some observers have argued 
that the creation of an Internet “blacklist” could ultimately lead to widespread censorship.  
 
Russia’s Minister of Interior, Rashid Nurgaliyev, suggested that monitoring of mass  
media to include Youtube and Facebook was necessary to manage “hate-mongering” and  
“extremism.”64 Director of Roskomnadzor, Mikhail Vorobyev, maintains that the  
creation of the Internet “black list” was necessary because the number of Internet media outlets 
was expanding.65 The spokesman for Roskomnadzor Vladimir Panin noted that the “nasty things 
filling the Internet must be dealt with in some way...”66 Russian officials have repeatedly offered 
reassurance that the ban on “harmful information” would specifically include web pages 
advocating suicide, substance abuse, child pornography, etc.67 At the same time, Roskomnadzor 
would continue to monitor the web for other “unlawful information” that would “instigate 
national and religious hatred or war propaganda” leaving considerable room for defining these 
types of threats.68  
   
The public response to the recent decision to permit ISAF access to the Ulyanovsk base for 
transit from Afghanistan is an interesting case in this regard. While Putin’s leadership evidently 
realizes that such support would contribute to achieving a desired outcome in Afghanistan, there 
was considerable opposition in Russian society to permitting NATO access to the Ulyanovsk 
base on Russian soil. Local courts in Russia blocked popular web services LiveInternet.ru and 
Tartala.ru for uploading nationalist videos opposing the government decision to allow NATO to 
use the Ulyanovsk base.  
   
It is important to note that leaders of European democracies have also favored imposing some 
restrictions on the Internet in the interest of societal security. For example, former French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy had called for a “civilized Internet” supporting the imposition of 
controls in the interest of making the Internet safe for children, commerce, and so forth. 69 The 
question still remains whether these new measures will ultimately lead to wide scale censorship 
of Russia’s Internet and social media. Imposing such restrictions, given the culture of freedom of 
the Internet that has existed in Russia, will not be easy even if this is the ultimate intention. 
Russia’s leadership has often underscored the importance of maintaining freedom of the Internet. 
In 2011, Vladimir Putin made the point in his annual address to the Duma that he opposed 
placing limitation on the Internet stating that there would be no “snip-snapping” [referencing a 
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popular Soviet era anecdote about the Cheka secret police] or censorship of Internet.70 President 
Medvedev made the point that “Russia will not support initiatives that put in doubt freedom in 
the Internet, freedom which is based on the requirements for morality and law.”71 He stated 
further that: “Blocking the Internet, cutting off global communication lines and attempting to 
reach agreement with one’s own people by force of arms….all this leads nowhere….”72 In the 
meeting with representatives of Russia’s online community held in 2011, Medvedev suggested 
that each nation must “find their own balance” in “regulating extremism or criminal activities 
and freedom” based on the particular values, traditions, and decisions of the  
country.73 Medvedev also noted that in comparison with other countries, Russia did not try to 
regulate everything.74  
  
Global and Regional Level Responses/Issues 
International agreements clearly delineating responsibilities for addressing the challenges 
presented by the use of the Internet and social media to disseminate extremist material or to 
indoctrinate recruits for the purposes of ultimately inciting violence might certainly be desirable. 
However, identifying common ground or establishing the basis for a unified international 
approach is fraught with difficulties as illustrated by the divergence among constitutional and 
legal provisions, and varying social-cultural expectations regarding the restrictions of freedom of 
expression and communication.  
 
The Internet Governance Forum (IGF) was created to serve as an international platform for 
managing the World Wide Web. Russian officials have often expressed concerns regarding 
“ideological domination” of the cyber sphere.75 Russians suggest that the United States maintains 
a leading competitive or even dominant position in the Internet with a disproportionate share of 
Domain Name System (DNS) servers and the leading Internet companies. Russians prefer a 
stronger role for the United Nations in governing the Internet holding the view that the current 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Numbers and Names (ICANN) establishes a dominant 
influence for the United States and other Western nations in the management of the Internet. In 
November 2012, Russia’s Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev suggested that laws should be 
developed “by all mankind” for the governances of the Internet, and complained that the United 
States does not want to participate since the United States “controls many things” in the 
Internet.76 Medvedev stated: “Is this fair or not? It is unfair. I believe that, if we look at the future 
of the Internet, for example, there should be common rules developed by all states, not by just 
one country or group of countries.”77 Medvedev continued noting that while it is necessary to 
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discuss creation of “global principles” for the world wide web, that it would be pointless to 
attempt to “monitor Internet content thoroughly” offering the observation that “if a topic became 
taboo in a particular state, the corresponding website is closed, the domain is closed, but an hour 
later is appears on a mirror website in another country…”78 
 
The United States and Russia prefer different terms and place different priorities in addressing 
the security in the Internet and the dissemination of violent extremist material online. While the 
United States uses the term “cybersecurity” defined as securing computer networks and 
promoting the free flow of information, Russia employs the reference to “information security” 
which encompasses managing Internet and social media content that could result in destabilizing 
a government.  
 
During the United Nations General Assembly in September 2011, Russia introduced a proposal 
entitled “International Code of Conduct for International Security” together with China, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan proposing a twelve point code of conduct based on the “need to 
prevent the potential use of information and communication technologies for purposes that are 
inconsistent with the objectives of maintaining international stability and security and adversely 
affect the integrity of infrastructure within states…”79 The document also called for pledges to 
curb “the dissemination of information that incites terrorism, secessionism, or extremism that 
undermines other countries’ political, economic and social stability, as well as their spiritual and 
cultural environment.”80 Nikolai Patrushev has stressed the importance of reaching an 
international agreement on the definition of “extremism,” but with a definition that would 
include “any attempt to subvert the state, take power by force or carry out terrorist activities.”81  
 
Many observers reacted to the proposal introduced by Russia and China in the UN suggesting 
that it could lead to censorship of international communication for any reason or filtering out 
communication that governments found objectionable. The U.S. approach placed priority on 
curbing cyber crime while ensuring free flow of information, but Russia and China clearly seek 
to limit cross-border information exchange that could result in destabilizing societies.82 Michele 
Markoff, State Department Senior Advisor on Cyber Affairs, described the aims of the Russia-
China proposal as intended “to justify the establishment of sovereign government control over 
Internet resources and over freedom of expression in order to maintain the security of their 
state.”83 
 
Nations of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization concluded an agreement in 2008 defining 
dissemination of “information harmful to social and political, social and economic systems, as 
well as spiritual, moral, and cultural spheres…” as among the main threats in the field of 
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“ensuring international information security.”84 Following the Arab Spring, concerns about the 
role of social media in playing an integral role in the uprisings ousting of longstanding 
dictatorships led nations of the CSTO to call for additional measures to combat extremism. At a 
CSTO meeting held in Bishkek in early 2011, Nikolai Bordyuzha, Secretary General of CSTO 
stated that “extremism is manifested in almost all CSTO countries, and we need to fight it, using 
common efforts.” 85 Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev recommended joint study of 
the sources of extremism, and suggested regulating extremist material in the Internet that could 
“endanger governments.” 86  
 
Members of the U.S. Congress across the political spectrum along with many private companies 
in the telecommunication and information/communication technology sector (ICTs) have 
objected to yielding greater control over the Internet to the United Nations. Russia, together with 
China, Brazil, and India, support shifting oversight of the Internet from the non-government 
ICANN to United Nations regulation. In December 2012, the World Conference on International 
Telecommunication (WCIT) met in Dubai with the mandate to review the International 
Telecommunications Regulations (ITRs). Ambassador Terry Kramer, Head of the U.S. 
delegation, addressed the conference rejecting measures to insert government control over the 
Internet, and instead emphasizing the importance of continuing to maintain the multi-stakeholder 
model of Internet governance.87 In this regard, the U.S. position was in direct opposition to 
Russian proposals that would transfer management of the Internet to the government.88 
 
Analysts have suggested that Russia’s proposal on the “International Code of Conduct for 
International Security” does offer several important areas where common ground could be 
established within Western nations including protection of critical infrastructure from cyber 
attacks, enhancing cyber capacity among nations of the world, cooperation in monitoring violent 
security threats, and continuing to develop international norms for managing the cyber arena. At 
the same time, Jason Healey rightly observes that critical differences remain noting that while 
the United States and the United Kingdom pledged that the laws of armed conflict would apply 
in the cyber arena, Russia (and China) have yet to agree to be bound by these provisions.89  
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Conclusion 
Challenges and Potential Opportunities for Engaging Russia on Countering Violent Extremism 
Post “Re-set” 
Nations must recognize the magnitude of the task in attempting to manage the Internet and social 
media mediums for preventing the promotion of violent extremist ideology. The sheer volume of 
communication passing through the Internet and social media arenas would render attempts to 
monitor or impose restrictions on communication through these channels overwhelming. 
National or international government efforts to censor or filter sites or chat rooms have not been 
effective. Officials in Saudi Arabia have been among the most direct in complaining that while 
they may be successful at shutting down a website promulgating a violent message in their 
country, it will not be effective if the same user can find a willing Internet Service Provider (ISP) 
host in another nation. It has been frequently the case that Western ISP’s can end up hosting 
these same sites without realizing it only because of the language barriers.  
 
It is equally daunting to consider the challenge of building standards acceptable to all nations of 
the international community for regulating the Internet and social media of the twenty first 
century. Even for two countries sharing the most common values, the United States and the 
United Kingdom, there are differences in the level of public and societal tolerance for freedom of 
speech and unhindered communication. Building commonly accepted standards and norms for 
managing these new mediums among the diverse global community has proved quite difficult in 
the United Nations, and may never be fully realized.  
 
Both the United States and Russia place a priority on countering terrorism and sources of violent 
extremism. However, as indicated, Russia’s perspective on “information security” differs 
fundamentally with the U.S. approach resting on commitment to preserving freedom of 
information in the Internet and social media. In fact, the U.S. State Department has gone so far as 
to pledge to “undermine repressive governments” that seek to silence segments of society by 
“censoring or shutting down telecommunications networks…”90  
 
Again, concerns on the part of Russia’s leadership regarding the potential destabilizing impact of 
mass societal movements of the Arab Spring have complicated challenges for working with 
Russia on CVE. The role of the Internet and social networks in the Arab Spring upheavals has 
led governments throughout Eurasia including Russia to be even more determined to seek 
additional safeguards in protecting their regimes from the free exchange of information on the 
Internet. Reprisals against members of the political opposition during Russia’s Spring 2012 
elections, and new legislation establishing an institutional structure for potentially limiting 
information in the Internet arena has created additional barriers in achieving common ground 
with the Russians in the CVE area. Russia’s current Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, was 
correct in suggesting that nations will find their own balance concerning standards of freedom of 
information and providing security or between regulating extremism or criminal activities and 
freedom, and it remains to be see how far the Russian leadership will go in imposing new 
restrictions in managing the flow of information in Russia’s Internet and news media arenas. 
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The CVE issue strikes at the foundation of the value system for any country. It will be critical to 
continue to share perspectives at the national and global levels as Russia and other 
Counterterrorism (CT) partner nations sort through these issues in the years ahead. We should 
make every attempt to maintain dialogue with Russia’s government and ministries and continue 
to engage with them at the official and academic levels to consider the interplay of societal 
values and strategies for effectively addressing the violent extremist challenge in the Internet and 
social media networks. The alternative is to refuse to engage on the issue with both countries 
potentially developing opposing strategies that can undermine effectiveness in this area. The 
challenges and differences notwithstanding, because of the priorities both countries place on 
countering terrorism and violent extremism, the CVE area still holds some potential as a part of a 
broad long-term sustained agenda for U.S.-Russia security collaboration post-“re-set.” 
 
In terms of specific recommendations, we must recognize that not only local or national, but also 
global engagement and collaboration are critical in countering violent extremism. The Obama 
Administration’s strategy entitled “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in 
the United States” recognizes the critical role of local community partnerships and resources to 
combat extremism, but the United States approach does not discount the vital role that 
international partners play in combating the CVE threat that transcends borders.91 In fact, as 
observers have noted, the U.S. counter terrorism strategy has been more global in focus, whereas 
other nations including Russia have tended to concentrate greater attention and resources on 
countering domestic sources of terrorism. The United States should continue to direct resources 
toward engaging Russia and other CT partner nations in exchanging “best practices” on 
countering violent extremism. Exchanges should include government, security and law 
enforcement, non-governmental organization (NGO), private sector, and academic expert 
communities across nations. Such collaboration is important for building trust and effective 
international responses on CVE. It is also important to exchange perspectives on areas of 
disagreement with the hope of reaching greater common ground. Community based approaches 
also form a vital component of an overall strategy reaching into local societies to ascertain 
causes of violence, and to compare similarities and differences for the drivers of radicalization 
across various contexts within or among nations.  
 
As a priority element of U.S. engagement with Russia and other global partners on CVE, we 
should encourage the exchange of perspectives and experiences in developing national strategies 
for addressing the CVE challenge. As noted, Russia is still referencing an Information Strategy 
(2000) that was formed nearly thirteen years ago before social media had become prevalent 
throughout the Internet. Officials and specialists in Russia working in this area have 
acknowledged that Russia is in need of further development of approaches, and could benefit by 
considering the elements of national strategies of other nations. Many countries of the world 
community still do not have strategies for cyber security and CVE, and not all countries have 
included sufficient consideration to CVE issues and implications for security in social media in 
articulating their national approaches. Again, given the transnational nature of this challenge, any 
national strategy will have to be coordinated globally in order to be effective.  
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In addition, at the national level, the United States should share the importance of 
communication among various relevant ministries or agencies in assuming responsibility for 
cyber security and meeting the CVE challenges present on the Internet. Many nations suffer the 
problem of lack of communication among various ministries in developing approaches on CVE. 
Oleg Demidov and others have acknowledged that traditions of conservatism and secrecy among 
Russia’s ministries can hamper effective responsiveness in this area.92 In addition, observers in 
Russia’s academic security community have noted that there is still a lack of clarity and 
transparency within Russia regarding appropriate agencies for managing the CVE challenge, and 
willingness on the part of some officials to share information regarding their responsibilities and 
approaches. 93 Twenty-first century communication among relevant entities at the national and 
global levels is critical for addressing the security challenges presented throughout the Internet 
and social media arenas.  
 
Experts in Russia working on Internet security and terrorist use of the Internet and social media 
to promote their agendas suggest one area for potential cooperation would include support for 
ongoing efforts to establish standards for appropriate user identification. Terrorists have 
exploited the feature of anonymity in the Internet to disseminate narratives. Establishing reliable 
means to identify users may be an important measure for addressing this challenge. Lax 
measures for user registration will be exploited by those purporting violence and other crimes, 
and we should encourage discussion of the issues surrounding standards for user identification in 
the Internet on an international level.  
 
Overall, Russians have more readily moved to simply shut down objectionable websites, rather 
than to permit such sites to remain functional for purposes of monitoring as in the United States. 
The Obama Administration strategy openly acknowledges the important role for monitoring the 
activities of violent extremists. The August 2011 CVE strategy states: “…We will continue to 
closely monitor the important role the Internet and social networking sites play in advancing 
violent extremist narratives…”94 Anders Breivik, who carried out the mass bombing and 
shooting attacks in Norway in 2011, evidently had contact with ultra-nationalist groups in Russia 
via Facebook.95 Intelligence agencies have certainly benefited by monitoring these sites and chat 
rooms providing opportunities to learn more about the ideology and tactics of violent groups, 
followers, and so forth. Russia’s security community has cooperated with the United States and 
other Western countries in monitoring and exchanging information on violent extremist threats in 
the Internet. There are obvious potential benefits for joint monitoring of such activities in the 
Internet, and international collaboration will be important for prevention of deadly attacks in the 
future. 
 
Governments of the twenty first century must recognize the power of the Internet and social 
media network and be prepared to engage in these communities in promulgating their narratives; 
otherwise terrorists or violent extremists will surely gain ground in the so-called information 
wars. At the governmental level, the Obama Administration has emphasized the importance of 
offering counter-narratives for the messages of those motivated by ideologies of violent 
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extremism, and then leaving it to the public to weigh different positions to reach their own 
conclusions on issues. The U.S. State Department has developed a team of bloggers in the 
Department’s Counterterrorism Communication Center to counter false stories and 
disinformation in a number of languages.  
 
In 2012, Russia’s Foreign Ministry opened a Facebook account and stepped up contributions on 
Twitter in recognition of the need to communicate positions to the public.96 Russia’s President 
Vladimir Putin appears to recognize the importance of official communication on the Internet 
using social media stating that “…You must explain our points of view again and again, on 
various platforms and using new technologies until the message gets across…”97 The Kremlin 
has enlisted bloggers in the North Caucasus and Chechnya to counter the messages of extremists, 
but these individuals can be identified with the government and thus can suffer a lack of 
credibility among the local target communities.  
 
The Internet, new social media sites, and real time communication forums in chat rooms or blogs 
provide significant venues for officials to engage directly with the public and the youth, and 
potentially greater transparency and better understanding of particular policy responses. National 
communication responses must make full use of the most sophisticated new technologies of the 
information revolution. It is critical that the potential audience for violent extremist movements 
not perceive government communication as attempts to manipulate societies or practice 
ideological “spin. To be effective, public diplomacy efforts and the messages delivered must be 
consistent with substantive policy and behavior. The importance of trusting the messenger can 
never be underestimated. Rather, an honest, open, and reliable communication holds the greater 
promise for effectiveness.  
 
Nations committed to combating terrorism and violent extremism must continue to devote 
attention and resources to addressing the underlying societal forces that create the environments 
that fuel terrorism. Much of the appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas or Hezbollah results 
from their ability to meet the desperate social service needs in poor communities or war-ravaged 
societies. Governments must realize the importance of providing potential recruits with better 
options than joining the ranks of terrorist movements.  
 
It is important to recognize that legitimate religious authorities possess the greatest potential for 
discrediting the Islamist violent extremist narrative. All investigations with respect to addressing 
this problem point to the critical role that religious authorities can offer in de-legitimizing the 
militant extremist narratives and messaging. The publication of the Amman Declaration on the 
official website of the Jordanian government, and in many other Internet sites, featuring official 
religious denunciation of violence has been quite significant in discrediting the violent extremist 
agenda. The Saudi Sakinah campaign that engages Islamic clerics online to turn extremists away 
from violence has demonstrated results, and offers a promising approach for the future. This 
program enables Imams to enter social media venues with a well-supported counter narrative 
denouncing the path of violence by specific reference to religious teachings. Directing resources 
toward amplifying the speeches of clerics who renounce violence are surely among the most 
effective strategies for addressing this problem.  
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Communication and narratives must continue to reinforce rejections of any notion of a “clash of 
cultures” or “clash of civilizations.” The visual messages featured on the websites of violent 
extremists often couple imagery of heaven and virtue with the violent cause. Communication at 
every level should challenge messages depicting death, destruction, and hate with promoting the 
will of God and human advancement. In an effort to de-legitimize the ideological underpinnings 
of militant extremist ideology, it is critical to use the Internet and social media arenas to expose 
the vision offered by al Qaida and its affiliates for the future of the international order. The 
imposition of a fanatic totalitarian theocratic order hardly seems like a realistic or appealing 
prospect for today’s international community, or for most of the world’s Muslim population. The 
fact is that the militant radical message is largely rejected within the Muslim world as 
inconsistent with the most fundamental teachings and values of Islam and lacking relevance to 
the realities of modern life. The recent uprisings sweeping Arab nations reflected the legitimate 
democratic aspirations of these societies and desire for greater economic opportunity and quality 
of life, not to promote the vision of a totalitarian global caliphate envisioned by al Qaida and its 
affiliates for the future of nations or the world community. 
 
The efforts of the Russian government and the Russian Orthodox Church to engage Russia’s 
Islamic clerics in condemning violence and violent extremism are promising and should be 
encouraged. Dmitry Medvedev made the point that: “It is important to create our own websites, 
extend our presence in the networks, create religious sites, giving Muslim preachers and all 
persons concerned an opportunity to speak up…”98 There should be further opportunities for 
engaging the religious communities in the United States and Russia in inter-religious dialogue 
and collaboration in countering terrorist and violent extremist narratives through the Internet and 
social network sites.  
  
As a part of the overall strategy to counter violent extremism, it is important for governments to 
consider partnership with the private sector on multiple levels. The United States, Russia, and 
other CT partner nations should pursue all options in cooperating with the private sector to 
develop Internet and social media initiatives targeting those vulnerable to the militant agenda, 
and contribute to developing alternatively more productive paths. The 2011 Summit Against 
Violent Extremist, hosted by Google Ideas bringing together former extremists across the 
spectrum to share perspectives, is a good example of the potential positive contributions to 
addressing the CVE challenge from the private sector.99 
 
Educational efforts on every level are obviously critical to combating the terrorist and violent 
extremist narratives. The Internet and social media arenas can provide major sources of 
information and knowledge resources, and should be fully appreciated and utilized in positive 
directions in pursuit of learning. Engaging the younger generation through these channels has 
become, and is likely to be even more important for the future. On a societal level, it is important 
that early education includes knowledge of the Internet, user agreements, social networks etc.100 
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At advanced educational levels, nations will require highly skilled technical and linguistic 
expertise to manage Internet and social networking security. Those in the government charged 
with responsibilities for Internet security must have the appropriate training and skills. This is 
often a problem because the frequently better incentives for employment in the private sector can 
continue to draw the most able experts away of the public sphere.  
 
The United States and Russia should encourage continued joint research collaboration on 
countering violent extremism. Since 9-11, we have made considerable progress in strengthening 
research resources and collaboration on terrorism throughout the world. In 2007, the Marshall 
Center collaborated with NATO’s Center for Excellence-Defense Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) 
and the NATO-Russia Council to hold a five-day conference in Ankara on societal sources of 
violent extremism. Several specialists from the United States, Russia, and Turkey contributed 
expertise to exploring the CVE issue from security, political, social, and cultural perspectives. 
Such initiatives contribute to building knowledge and common understanding of these complex 
challenges. The United States, Russia, and other CT partner nations can benefit by developing 
additional methods and objective case studies for unraveling the sources of radicalization. 
Comparative studies of websites and chat rooms in different languages also provide valuable 
resources for domestic and international intelligence agencies or those responsible for countering 
the terrorist narratives.  
 
Finally, the United States should continue to emphasize in discussions with the Russians in the 
CVE working group and other channels the importance of cultivating mechanisms for 
democratic participation as a means for countering the violent extremist appeals. Particularly for 
nations with diverse multi-cultural populations, cultivating a strong sense of citizenship rather 
than ethnic affinity is essential for national cohesion. Russia’s success in managing the 
challenges of diversity will be critical for the future development of the nation. The violent 
Islamist agenda threatens the United States, Russia, and many other nations throughout the world. 
At the same time, threats from radical ultra-nationalists should also not be underestimated. 
Legitimate channels for participating in the political process or resolving grievances available in 
established democratic systems provide appropriate and effective alternatives to violence and 
terrorism for those seeking to achieve political objectives. The tsunami of violent upheaval 
sweeping Arab nations was to no small extent fueled by the Internet and social media savvy of 
young people who sought freedom and opportunities for self expression in governance after 
decades of suffering, and who could no longer continue to tolerate entrenched authoritarian 
repression and lack of opportunity. Hence, commitment to maintaining democratic values and 
institutions, protecting freedom of information, ensuring human rights for all citizens are some of 
the most potent weapons in countering the agenda of violent extremists across the political 
spectrum.  
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